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Attacking the Sacred Cow.
The Norwegian Challenge to the EC’s Acquis Communautaire
in the Enlargement Negotiations of 1970-72
Robin M. ALLERS
On 30 June 1970 the European Communities (EC) opened membership negotiations
with Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway in Luxembourg.1 This act formally
ended a decade of crises most of them caused by French president Charles de Gaulle’s
blockade of EC-enlargement.2 Building on the agreement reached at their summit
meeting in The Hague in December 1969, the Six were able to meet the candidates
with a common negotiating position that emphasised unity. As the acting Council
president and the president of the Commission explained in their opening speeches,
the EC would insist on the acceptance of the acquis communautaire in its entirety.
Furthermore, the candidates would have to agree on the Community’s political goals
and the further development of communitarian policies was not to be delayed because
of the enlargement process. Derogations from the acquis would not be allowed, only
transitional arrangements which had to be the same for all parties.3
Speaking after his colleagues from the other candidate countries, the Norwegian
Foreign Minister Svenn Stray managed to shake up the audience. As could have been
expected from the application text and the White Paper, his government insisted on
a special scheme for Norway’s agriculture which de facto amounted to a permanent
exemption of his country from the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Similar to
his fellow applicants, Stray further demanded that Norway’s voice should be heard
in deliberations on a Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). Like his Danish colleague he
asked that already existing agreements with Nordic non-members should be main-
tained. Contrary to the previous speakers, however, Stray did not mention the Com-
munity’s political goals that had recently been revitalised at The Hague.4 Instead he
1. This article is based on research done for my PhD thesis published as R.M. ALLERS, Besondere
Beziehungen – Deutschland, Norwegen und Europa in der Ära Brandt (1966-1974), Dietz-Verlag,
Bonn, 2009. I am grateful for comments and suggestions from participants at the workshops on the
history of the CAP in Paris (5/2009) and Maastricht (4/2010), and from participants at the 2010
conference of the Oslo International Contemporary History Network.
2. W. LOTH (ed.), Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963-1969, Nomos, Baden-Baden,
2001; N.P. LUDLOW, The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s. Negotiating the Gaul-
list Challenge, Routledge, London, 2006.
3. Erklärungen bei der Eröffnung der Konferenz der Europäischen Gemeinschaften und der beitritts-
willigen Staaten in Luxemburg am 30. Juni 1970, in: Europa Archiv, 15–16/1970, pp.D 351–D374,
here D 351–D358. See also EG-KOMMISSION: Vierter Gesamtbericht über die Tätigkeit der Ge-
meinschaften 1970, Brüssel 1971, p.284.
4. J. VAN DER HARST, The 1969 Hague Summit: A new start for Europe?, in: Journal of European
Integration History, 2(2003), pp.5–9; J. MITTAG, W. WESSELS, Die Gipfelkonferenzen von Den
Haag (1969) und Paris (1972), Meilensteine für Entwicklungstrends der Europäischen Union?, in:
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spoke of the Rome Treaties as a suitable basis for cooperation in Europe and he merely
acknowledged that the present situation seemed favourable to build bridges between
the two Western European market formations, i.e. the EC and the European Free
Trade Association (EFTA).5
The Norwegian declaration provoked reactions ranging from astonishment to an-
noyance. The claim to exempt Norway from the CAP clearly represented an attack
on the Communitarian principles. However, it was not so much the claim for excep-
tions but the obvious lack of political commitment that provoked the Six.6 A Dutch
diplomat was quoted stating that had a similar declaration come from the British, the
Community would have not opened the negotiations in the first place.7 Few stayed
as relaxed as Belgian diplomat Count Étienne Davignon who rightly observed that
the declaration was mainly directed to a domestic audience.8
Later the same day, it was the Norwegians’ turn to be shocked and annoyed.
Despite intense lobbying from all four applicants, the Six decided to establish a
Common Fisheries Policy disregarding the fact that enlargement with three of the
world’s largest fishing nations would change the Community’s standing and identity
in this sector completely. To representatives from Norway’s influential fisheries sec-
tor, the planned CFP meant an unwelcome development and changed their relatively
positive view of EC membership to outright hostility. To all those who were sceptical
of EC-membership because they feared the loss of national sovereignty, the decision
to implement the policy seemed proof that small states would have a limited influence
in Community affairs.9
Together, the Norwegian statement and the following Council decision on the
establishment of a CFP made for a worst possible start and placed Norway right next
to Britain as the most difficult case in the upcoming negotiations. Indeed, Norway’s
intricate problems in the primary sector would also dominate the negotiations’ final
phase, even jeopardizing the successful termination of the entire enlargement process.
Some of the Norwegian claims, among them the maintenance of direct subsidies for
some dairy products or the permanent exclusion of foreign vessels from coastal waters
challenged Community principles that were regarded as “sacred cows” among the
F. KNIPPING, M. SCHÖNWALD (eds.), Aufbruch zum Europa der Zweiten Generation. Die euro-
päische Einigung 1969-1984, VWT Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, Trier, 2004, pp.3-27.
5. Erklärungen …, op.cit., S.D371–374.
6. Eröffnung der EWG-Beitrittsverhandlungen, in: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 01.07.1970.
7. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UD) 44.36/6.84-34, UD, Presseavdelingen, Kommentarer i
utenlandsk presse til det norske åpningsinnlegget 30.06.70.
8. UD 44.36/6.84-34, Brussels to UD, 07.07.1970, EEC. Åpningen av utvidelsesforhandlingene. Samta-
le i det belgiske utenriksministerium.
9. UD 44.36/6.84-34, Brussels to UD, Norge og EEC – samtale med Mansholt. For a survey of reactions
see H. ALLEN, Norway and Europe in the 1970s, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo 1979. Based mainly on
official documents and journalistic contributions, Allen’s work remains one of the most comprehen-
sive accounts of the 1970-72 negotiations.
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Six.10 In the end, both sides were able to reach a compromise allowing Norway to
sign the accession agreement on 22 January 1972 alongside the other applicants. Still,
the agreement proved to be unacceptable to a majority of the Norwegian electorate.
Following one of the most divisive campaigns in Norwegian history, the treaty of
accession was rejected in a popular referendum on 25 September 1972. Why? Was
the negative outcome of Norway’s bid for membership predetermined, due to prin-
cipled negotiation positions on both sides? Or did the negotiations leave room for a
compromise that would have satisfied Norwegian farmers and fishermen and with
them the general public? Every compromise, of course, would have had to take the
Community principles into account.
The first round of enlargement has been at the centre of interest for integration
historians for more than a decade now. Despite the fact that government and Com-
munity archives now allow for in depth study of internal and multilateral deliberations
and processes, few studies have so far addressed the 1970-72 round in detail.11 Studies
addressing the Norwegian case have mainly dealt with the question of national mo-
tives: Why did Norway stay apart from the first steps of integration in the 1950s, why
did it follow the UK and Denmark in the 1960s and why did it become the only
applicant not to ratify the accession treaty in 1972? Explanations have been sought
in economic, geopolitical and domestic factors. Insisting that economic factors can
best explain Norwegian choices to apply and to say no, Hans Otto Frøland suggests
that the application under the Rome Treaties’ article 237 TEEC was merely instru-
mental, i.e. a way to find out how far the Community was ready to go. When met
with opposition based on Communitarian principles, a “national will” to achieve full
membership was missing.12 Frøland’s contribution highlights two important aspects
that are necessary to understand Norway’s attitude towards European integration:
firstly, the government’s struggle to find a balance between the export and shipping
sector’s interest in open markets and the need to protect the primary sector’s special
position; secondly the tactical moves resulting from this dilemma, often leading to a
certain ambivalence in the government’s communication. When suggesting that the
constraints of Norway’s political economy and a lack of political will doomed every
attempt for membership to failure, however, Frøland seems to downplay another as-
pect: that a large part of the political, administrative and industrial elite went actively
in for full membership and – also for political reasons – fought for entry both in the
negotiations and in the referendum campaign. Moreover, through their numerous
encounters with politicians and officials from the Six, Norwegian negotiators were
susceptible to obtain a better understanding of EC cooperation, in some cases leading
10. Bundesarchiv (BA) B 136/8016, Aufzeichnung BMLF VII B3 und BMWFi, F/V B4, 26.11.1971,
176. Tagung des Rates der EG; TO-Punkt: Beitrittsverhandlungen; hier: Norwegische Landwirt-
schaft.
11. For an annotated bibliography see J. ELVERT, W. KAISER (eds.): European Union Enlargement.
A Comparative History, Routledge, London, 2004. This first overall survey of EC and EU enlarge-
ment processes unfortunately does not contain a chapter on Norway.
12. H.O. FRØLAND, Choosing the Periphery: The Political Economy of Norway’s Relation to Euro-
pean Integration 1948–1973, in: Journal of European Integration History, 1(2001), pp.77–103, here
p.84.
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to a more positive view of the advantages offered by membership. To be sure, every
Norwegian government had to negotiate for the maintenance of as much sovereignty
in key areas as possible. Some politicians, however, adopted the point of view that
in the end every solution had to be in line with Community principles and that political
goodwill was needed to achieve a result embracing Norway’s concerns. A detailed
analysis of the negotiating process, contrasting attitudes and proposals on both sides
is necessary to assess the impact of individual and collective initiatives pushing for
a successful accession.
Very little research has been done so far on the EC’s attitude towards the smaller
applicant countries. Recent studies have suggested that some countries, most often
led by Germany, “were willing to compromise on the acquis to ease conditions for
British accession”.13 This was also the case concerning Norway.14 On the other side,
countries like France and the Netherlands, sometimes supported by the Commission,
rejected any move likely to undermine the acquis. When worried about their national
interests, however, as in the case of the CFP, these countries were able to show a great
deal of flexibility.15
Looking at the development of negotiating positions on both sides and following
the dynamics of the negotiations themselves, this article explores to what extent the
Community was willing to consider a permanent exemption for the Norwegian pri-
mary sector (agriculture and fisheries), and how far the Norwegian government was
able to move away from its maximum position demanding permanent exemptions
from the CAP and the CFP. The first section revisits the negotiation positions and
addresses the question of motives, i.e. why Norway applied for membership despite
having problems agreeing on basic Community principles and why the community
agreed to open negotiations despite being fully aware of Oslo’s reluctant attitude
towards political integration. The second section analyses the negotiations of
1970-72, asking to what extent both sides were willing to compromise. Was the Nor-
wegian side ready to accept Community principles and how much support was gained
from those voices among the Six who advocated for a softening of the communitarian
principles? Summing up the results of the negotiations and taking into account the
negative outcome of the ratification process, the concluding section raises the coun-
terfactual question whether a different outcome would have been possible.
13. M. RASMUSSEN, State power and the acquis communautaire in the European Community of the
early 1970s, in: J. VAN DER HARST (ed.), Beyond the Customs Union. The European Community’s
Quest for Deepening, Widening and Completion, 1969-1975, Bruylant, Brussels, 2007, pp.359-375,
here p.366.
14. On Germany’s special role as Norway’s ally among the Six, see R.M. ALLERS, Besondere Bezie-
hungen …, op.cit.
15. M. RASMUSSEN, State power …, op.cit., pp.369 f.
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1. Motives and principles
The Norwegian challenge
Most studies on Norway’s case agree that the country opted for an application under
article 237 TEEC forced by external pressures, i.e. Great Britain’s and Denmark’s
decision to join. It is equally agreed that economic considerations dominated even
though political and strategic motives also played a part. In any case, however, mem-
bership was only conceivable if derogations from existing Community policies were
granted. Already when applying for EC membership in 1962, Norwegian politicians
and officials stressed the geographically exposed, and thus special, character of their
country’s agriculture.16 One third of the country was situated North of the polar circle
and the growing seasons were on average shorter than in continental Europe. Due to
a landscape dominated by fjords and mountains – also further South – the average
size of a Norwegian farm was five hectares compared to 11 hectares in the member
states.17 All this made Norwegian agriculture comparatively unproductive and called
for substantial support from the government. Maintaining this support through sub-
sidies and protectionist measures was regarded as crucial because settlement through-
out the entire country was regarded as necessary, both for reasons of nation building
and for reasons of security, referring to the frontier with the Soviet Union. The latter
arguments also called for the protection of the equally dispersed fishing industries,
relying mainly on smaller vessels and operating in the coastal waters rich in fish. In
1961 Norway had unilaterally extended its fishing limits to 12 nautical miles and had
defended this decision ever since. In this sector, however, Norway had developed
into an exporting power of significance and the well organized marketing organisa-
tions had to balance their reluctance to allow competition with their interest in access
to European and World markets. Nevertheless, both farmers and fishermen were
equally sceptical about giving up the shelter provided by the government and to accept
the necessary adaptation and liberalisation as a consequence of EC membership.18
The insistence on special conditions for the primary sector was even more im-
portant as scepticism towards membership was also linked to political reservations
about the integration process. Norway had been absent at the creation of the supra-
national institutions. Pointing to its young age as an independent nation state and to
the recently achieved liberation from German occupation in World War II, Norway
refrained from any limitation of its sovereignty and proved to be particularly allergic
to the term “union”. In addition, being a country with a distinctive social democratic
16. H.O. FRØLAND, Advancing Ambiguity: On Norway’s application for EEC-membership in 1962,
in: S. DAHL (ed.), National Interest and the EEC/EC/EU, Trondheim, DKNVS Skrifter, 1999, pp.
53–76; K.E. ERIKSEN, H. PHARO, Kald krig og internasjonalisering 1949-1965, Norsk Utenrik-
spolitikks Historie (NUPH), vol.5, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 1997, pp.339-249.
17. F. BOUYSSOU, Les problèmes agricoles d'une Europe à dix, in: L'Europe en formation,
138-139(Sept.-Oct. 1971), pp.3-7.
18. The most thorough and comprehensive analysis of Norway’s political economy and its reluctance
to join the Common Market is H.O. FRØLAND, Choosing the Periphery …, op.cit.
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profile, Norway regarded the emerging Communities as a Western European fortress,
ruled by conservative governments with a capitalistic agenda.
In 1962 external pressure resulting from the British and Danish applications was
the single most important reason to consider an application. Economic considerations
– the prospect of seeing at least one of its main trading partners and at least one Nordic
neighbour move over behind the Community’s tariff walls – were decisive for Nor-
way’s decision to seek a form of association. Although some politicians and bureau-
crats had become interested in the political ideas underlying the European project,
the Norwegian government was quite happy with the EFTA solution and would have
preferred a less committing affiliation. Little was known by then about the CAP and
its possible impact on Norwegian agriculture – not to speak of the non-existent fish-
eries policy. But scepticism was growing among representatives from the primary
sector as to Norway’s ability to shape the EEC’s policies in these domains. Moreover,
less than 20 years after the end of World War II the idea of joining a supranational
community in which Germany and France were the dominating powers had little
appeal. Facing growing opposition in the electorate and among party rank and file,
the governing Social Democrats were relieved rather than shocked when de Gaulle
brought the process to an end.19
Norway’s 1967 application was again first and foremost provoked by the renewed
British initiative followed immediately by Denmark and Ireland. This time, however,
it was a government composed of both sceptics and advocates that forwarded an
application.20 Those who had voted against an application in 1962 now agreed to
renew it, although with great difficulties. The sceptics from the centre party – among
them Prime Minister Per Borten – the Christian Party and the Liberals finally gave
in to pressure from their conservative coalition partners and worked out an application
for full membership. The alternative preferred by the sceptics since 1962, an associ-
ation agreement under article 238 TEEC, was rejected by the conservatives and even
judged undemocratic by legal experts. The latter emphasised that such an agreement
would not allow the associated country to exert its influence on Community decision
making while forcing it to adopt most of the EC’s policies. As the labour friendly
daily Arbeiderbladet pointed out, Britain had rejected an association agreement
exactly for this reason.21 In addition, several EC countries regarded an association
19. H.O. FRØLAND, Advancing Ambiguity …, op.cit.; K.E. ERIKSEN, H. PHARO, op.cit.
20. H.O. FRØLAND, The Second Norwegian EEC-Application, 1967: Was There a Policy at all?, in:
W. LOTH (ed.), Crises and Compromises …, op.cit., pp.437–458; D.A. KRISTOFFERSEN, Nor-
way’s Policy towards the EEC. The European Dilemma of the Centre Right Coalition
(1965-1971), in: K. RÜCKER, L. WARZOULET (eds.), Quelle(s) Europe(s)/Which Europe(s)?
Nouvelles approches en histoire de l'intégration européenne, PIE Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2006, pp.
209–224; R. TAMNES, Oljealder 1965-1995, NUPH, Vol.6, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 1997, pp.
165-167.
21. Assosiering til EEC uforenlig med Grunnloven? Paragraf 93 krever at vi får medbestemmelses-
rett!”, in: Arbeiderbladet, 05.07.1967. Interestingly, the EEA-agreement, governing Norway’s re-
lationship with the EU since 1994, has to strive with exactly the same problem. E.O. ERIKSEN,
Norges demokratiske underskudd, in: Nytt Norsk Tidskrift, 4(2008), pp.368-379.
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agreement as inadequate for an industrialised country.22 After lengthy internal de-
bates, the government decided to send an application under Art. 237 TEEC without
mentioning alternative solutions. However, the sceptics insisted that the official
government White Paper preparing the negotiations refrain from declaring member-
ship as the only option.23 Moreover, the claim for special rules had to be given a
central part. According to Frøland, the government went actively in for testing to
what extent the Community would be ready to meet Norway’s demands. Some gov-
ernment members had become convinced that the Community might be willing to
offer a de facto exemption from the CAP under the concept of regional policy.24 There
were, however, few indications that the Six would have accepted such a deal. Already
in 1967, a solid consensus existed in Brussels that every exception had to be negoti-
ated in conformity with the principles laid down in the Treaties of Rome. According
to Italian Foreign Minister Amintore Fanfani it was unimaginable – even with a good
portion of goodwill – to see the Community agree to measures that were likely to
destroy the edifice that the Community had so carefully constructed over years.25
Even supporters of Norwegian entry, like Willy Brandt, insisted that every solution
had to be found within the framework of the Rome Treaty and proposed to look for
a deal under the Community’s regional policy.26 This proposal did not entirely meet
Norwegian claims, however. To secure settlements along the long coastline, in the
many mountainous areas and in the far North, Oslo was asking for a permanent
exemption from CAP and the CFP for the entire country.27
When de Gaulle vetoed enlargement for the second time in December 1967, the
question whether Norway’s claims would stand any chance in negotiations with the
Six was postponed for the second time. Although this outcome was greeted with relief
by the sceptics, the government joined Britain, Denmark, and Ireland in maintaining
its application. The following two years showed that there was no viable alternative
to membership. As long as Denmark and Britain prioritized membership, neither
plans for revitalizing EFTA nor plans for the creation of a Nordic customs union
22. UD 44.36/6.84-25, Notat, UD, 1. Handelspol. Kontor, 15.03.1967, Statsråd Willochs besøk i Haag
8.-9. mars 1967. Samtale med statssekretær de Block; BA, B 136, Bd.7980, Aufzeichnung BK/
Gruppe II/1, 11.08.1967, Betr.: Beitritte und Assoziationen der EWG.
23. Norwegian National Archives (Riksarkivet, RA), SMK, regj. konf., bd. 24, 13.07.1967.
24. H.O. FRØLAND, The Second Norwegian EEC-Application …, op.cit., pp.441 and 456.
25. UD 44.36/6.84-26, Rome to UD, 03.05.1967, Samtale mellom Willoch og utenriksminister Fanfani
26.04.1967. See also UD 44.36/6.84-25, Brussels to UD, 17.10.1966, Willoch’s besøk i Brüssel.
26. UD 44.36/6.84-28, Notat, UD, 1. Handelspol. Kontor, 27.06.1967, Utenriksminister Brandts besøk
i Oslo; PA AA, B 60, Bd.520, Oslo to AA, 26.06.1967; PA AA, B 20, Bd.1246, Dg IA über D I an
Staatssekr., 24.07.1967, Betr.: Norwegischer Antrag auf Beitritt zur EWG.
27. Norwegian diplomats emphasized the need to make their German counterparts understand that it
was equally difficult to maintain effective fishing and agriculture in the North as in the fjords and
valleys further South of the country. UD 44.36/6.84-29, Notat, UD, 1. Handelspol. Kontor,
12.10.1967, Møte i den norsk tyske blandede kommisjon 16.-17.10.67; EEC og utvidelsesspørsmå-
let.
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(NORDEK) had any future. Different schemes for accession or free trade agreements
gained no support as long as they did not include a roadmap to membership.28
This situation remained unchanged when the Community finally decided to open
negotiations with the applicants, following General de Gaulle’s retreat from power
in April 1969. As mentioned above, the same demands as in 1962 and in 1967 were
key elements of Foreign Minister Stray’s opening address on 30 June 1970. To his
credit, the declaration he read on behalf of his government was not what Stray would
have chosen to say in private. In a government split on the EC membership issue, his
party, the conservatives (Høyre) were the only one unambiguously in favour. Stray
himself was even known to be one of the few who supported entry for political reasons
and in the run-up to the negotiations he had already clashed several times with the
Prime Minister over questions of strategy. Supported by experts from the ministry of
Foreign Affairs and by members of the Parliament’s foreign affairs committee he
maintained that in order to obtain goodwill, Norway had to show its willingness to
fully participate in the European project.29 This meant both the acceptance of the
Community’s political goals and a conciliatory line with regard to special solutions
for the primary sector. To insist on demands that would go explicitly against com-
munity principles would only harden positions. At the same time Stray knew that
neither the political class nor the electorate would accept EC membership without
obtaining major concessions if not a permanent exemption from the CAP. When
meeting the Six for the first bilateral round of negotiations on 22 September 1970,
Stray thus accepted the basic principles of the Community’s position, but he reiterated
the demand for a permanent exemption from the CAP together with the claim to
participate in the formulation the CFP. As he explained to his EC colleagues, if no
satisfying solution would be found, it was not sure whether a majority for entry could
be secured in the population.30
Both sectors were closely linked but in the negotiations they were treated in se-
parate chapters and indeed posed quite different problems: Contrary to the agrarian
sector where Norway was irrelevant on an international basis, its fisheries sector was
one of the largest in the world and contributed significantly to the country’s export.
Whereas the CAP had been part of Norwegian discussions on EC membership since
1962, neither in 1962 nor in 1967 the Community had agreed on a CFP. And finally,
in the fisheries sector Norway was not alone in challenging the Community.
All four applicants had demanded participation in shaping the emerging common
policy in this sector. Oslo’s main argument here was that enlarging the Community
by three of the world’s leading exporters of fish would change the character of the
CFP anyway. Distinguishing itself from the other candidates, Norway also claimed
28. See contributions by Hans Otto Frøland and Dag Axel Kristoffersen and Robin Allers in: J. HECK-
ER-STAMPEHL (ed.), Between Nordic ideology, economic interests and political reality. New
perspectives on Nordek, Finska Vetenskaps-Societeten, Helsinki 2009.
29. See for example the debates in the Norwegian parliament’s committee for foreign affairs (Stortingets
Utvidede Utenriks- og konstitusjonskomité, SUUKK) on the 27.08 and 08.10.1970.
30. HAEU, SGCICEE, 12109, French ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE), Bruxelles to Paris,
24.09.1970.
66 Robin M. ALLERS
https://doi.org/10.5771/0947-9511-2010-2-59
Generiert durch IP '77.245.13.132', am 03.04.2019, 13:24:06.
Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.
that its system of distribution and price management was more adequate than the one
proposed by the Community. Most importantly, Norway demanded a special perma-
nent regime for its entire coastline. The 12-mile exclusive zone that Norway had
established in 1964 was to be preserved and further expansion not to be excluded.
Consequently, Norway’s negotiators were demoralised when the Community agreed
on two directives aimed at establishing the CFP the very day the negotiations were
opened. Although the timing was nearly provocative, the decision itself did not come
unexpected. Diplomats had reported since 1966 that a CFP was in the making and
that Norway probably would have to adapt to it.31 Since The Hague summit in 1969
Norwegian politicians and diplomats, together with their even more active Danish
and British colleagues, had in vain tried to influence the Community.32 On 30 June
the CFP was on its way and had become part of the EC’s negotiation position.
At least the applicants were now aware of what the new policy would look like
and could start to conceive a strategy to revise it. In Norway working groups con-
sisting of government experts and representatives from the primary sector discussed
four alternatives: The first alternative was to maintain the Norwegian policy with
exclusive fishing rights reserved for Norwegian citizens inside the 12-mile zone. This
was the preferred solution for both the government and the primary sector, but was
regarded by officials as having little chance of acceptance by the EC.33 The second
alternative was the so-called establishment or settlement strategy, proposing fishing
rights in the exclusive zone to all those who would settle formally in the coastal region.
Two other alternatives were discussed but rejected as unacceptable to Norway: a
division of the exclusive zone into two 6-mile zones, the outer-one being accessible
to vessels from countries with traditional fishing rights, and, finally, a division of the
coastline, granting special rights (i.e. maintenance of the 12-mile zone) only to
Northern Norway because of harsh conditions. This last alternative corresponded to
the “regional” solution informally proposed by Community representatives for both
the agricultural and the fisheries sector. In the Norwegian view, however, the entire
country had to be regarded as a special area. A division of the coastline would not
make sense, it was argued, because fishermen from the South followed the fish to the
North according to the season.34
Discussions on the negotiation position uncovered considerable disagreement in-
side the government and among members of parliament as to how to phrase the Nor-
wegian concerns. Most pro-European members of the cabinet, assisted by diplomats
31. UD 44.36/6.84-25, Notat, Handelsdep., Avd. for utenrikshandel, 19.11.1966, Økonomiske proble-
mer ved en norsk tilslutning til EEC.
32. UD 44.36/6.84-31, Paris to UD, 11.12.1969, Handelsminister Willochs samtale med utenriksmi-
nister Schumann 10/12.
33. SUUKK, Session on 27.08.1970.
34. UD 44.36/6.84-41, Notat, Brüssel, 16.17.1971, Utvidelsen av EF. Fiskerigrensen og jordbruket i
Norge – Sverige og EF. See also UD 44.36/6.84-36, Notat, UD, Forhandlingsdelegasjon 21.11.1970,
Frankrikes syn på de norske medlemsskapsforhandlinger. In earlier negotiations a division had been
discussed in governement and parliamentary consultations, but was never proposed officially. See
K.E. ERIKSEN, H. PHARO, op.cit., p.367.
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from embassies in Brussels and Paris, argued that a conciliatory line would be more
productive. To insist on demands that would go explicitly against Community prin-
ciples would only harden positions.35 Despite these disagreements on strategy, there
was a broad agreement as to the necessity of obtaining derogations.
The Community’s response
The Norwegian demand for exemption from the CAP was perceived as a challenge
to core Community principles. Introducing a study by Hans Otto Frøland on Norway’s
claims for special rights, Fernando Guirao suggested in 2001 that further research
was needed to clarify why the Community opened negotiations with this country at
all.36 Indeed, in the course of the negotiations it was suggested several times that
Norway should rather look for an agreement similar to the one Sweden and the other
remaining EFTA-members were after. At the same time, however, NATO-member
Norway was always regarded as a natural candidate for membership. Willy Brandt
in particular maintained that Norway and the other Scandinavian countries should
take part in the European project because of their democratic traditions.37 French
politicians such as Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann also expressed their interest
in seeing Norway becoming a member.38 Norwegian negotiators did their best to
convey the image of Norway being a European country. Meeting Community repre-
sentatives, both Brussels based diplomats and members of government repeatedly
insisted on the fact that Norway was applying for membership. This became par-
ticularly evident after a minority government formed by the labour party took over
in March 1971. A statement to the negotiations conference and a new white book
were both regarded as pro-European in tone and substance.39 Prime Minister Trygve
Bratteli soon gained a reputation for being the Scandinavian statesman with the
35. A. HALLENSTVEDT, B. DYNNA, Fra skårunge til høvedsmann. Med Norges Fiskarlag gjennom
50 år, Norges fiskarlag, Trondheim, 1976, p.428.
36. F. GUIRAO, Peripheral countries and the Integration of Europe, in: Journal of European Integra-
tion History, 1(2001), p.7; cf. H.O. FRØLAND, Choosing the Periphery …, op.cit.
37. R.M. ALLERS, Die schwierige Erweiterung. Willy Brandt und die Verhandlungen der EG mit den
skandinavischen Ländern 1966-1973, in: A. WILKENS (ed.), Wir sind auf dem richtigen Weg. Willy
Brandt und die europäische Einigung, Dietz, Bonn, 2010, pp.276-304.
38. Schumann told his Norwegian colleague in December 1970 that France wanted to help for two
reasons: Out of a deep sympathy for heaving experienced the same situation in 1940 and because
both countries shared a similar view on most questions in international affairs, especially regarding
détente. UD 44.36/6.84-37, Paris to UD, 11.12.1970, Utenriksministerens samtaler med utenriks-
minister Schumann, 10.12.70.
39. UD 44.36/6.84-39, Notat, UD, Forhandlingsdel., 02.04.1971, Referat fra ministermøtet EF-Norge
30.03.1971; UD 44.36/6.84-39, Brussels to UD, 01.04.1971, Norge-EF. Siste Ministerrådsmøte;
UD 44.36/6.84-39, Brussels to UD, 02.04.1971, Norge-EF. Erklæringen av 30.05.1971.
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strongest European attitude.40 But even at the times of the coalition government,
whose Prime Minister Borten was accused of playing a double game, negotiating for
membership while publicly expressing a negative attitude towards the EC, the Min-
isters of Trade and Foreign Affairs would present the membership option as official
policy.41 If the Norwegian application was merely instrumental, this was not the im-
pression given to the EC.
How then did the Six deal with the ambivalence characterising the Norwegian
position and how did they react to the challenge it represented to the acquis? A per-
manent exemption of the entire country from CAP-rules was not acceptable to the
Community. Part of the package deal at the basis of the Rome Treaties, the CAP was
at the core of the acquis.42 When Norwegian politicians and diplomats first launched
the idea of permanent exceptions in 1962, the Community reacted with reserva-
tions.43 However, the Norwegian case never made it further than through exploratory
talks before de Gaulle brought the enlargement process to an end. Five years later,
when Norway again presented its plan of joining with reservations, the EC was split
between France and the so-called friendly five. German support for enlargement was
then much more political, linked to the so called Ostpolitik.44 Concerning Norway’s
request for special rights, however, Community representatives were even more ex-
plicit in their rejection.45 The EC had just gone through the empty chair crisis that
was partly provoked by a row over the CAP. Despite its bad reputation as a setback
to further integration, the Luxembourg compromise of 1966 had certainly strength-
ened the CAP. As a result, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries supported en-
largement but did not dare to provoke France over agriculture. Following de Gaulle’s
second “no” in December 1967, some countries considered, but later dismissed a plan
to use France’s dependence on the CAP as a “weapon” in order to force a breakthrough
in the enlargement question. Politicians and officials alike were prudent enough to
40. INSTITUT FÜR ZEITGESCHICHTE (ed.), Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland, (AAPD), 1972, Doc.19, Aufzeichnung Botschafter Sachs, 02.02.1972. Cf. HAEU,
Oral history Programme, Voices on Europe, Wellenstein, INT 569, p.31.
41. UD 44.36/6.84-25, Notat, (Bonn), 22.02.1967, Willochs samtale med Brandt. Only when Foreign
Minister Stray claimed in November 1970 that, contrary to 1962, Norway was now in favour of
integration out of political reasons, the Prime Minister intervened. For a recent, archive based study
of his, see H. BERNTSEN, Staurberaren. Per Borten, Aschehoug, Oslo 2007, pp.349 f.
42. See N.P, LUDLOW, The Green Heart of Europe: the rise and fall of the CAP as Europe's central
policy, 1965-85, in: K. PATEL (ed.), Fertile Ground for Europe? The history of European inte-
gration and the Common Agricultural Policy since 1945, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2009.
43. K.E. ERIKSEN, H. PHARO, op.cit., pp.344 f.; PA, B20, Bd.1246, Brussels to AA, 14.11.1962,
EWG-Beitrittsverhandlungen mit Norwegen; 1. Ministertagung am 12.11.1962.
44. A. WILKENS, L’Europe en suspens. Willy Brandt et l’orientation de la politique européenne de
l’Allemagne fédérale 1966-1969, in: W. LOTH (ed.), Crises and Compromises …, op.cit., pp.
323-343, here p.329.
45. R.M. ALLERS, Besondere Beziehungen …, op.cit., pp.251 f.
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use this weapon at best indirectly or passively.46 The fear of destabilizing a carefully
constructed compromise also dominated the situation on the eve of the EC summit
at The Hague in December 1969. A finalization of the CAP’s financial system was
due until the end of the year. But instead of using France’s agreement finally to go
ahead with enlargement for a revision of the CAP, the German government again
refrained from all kind of pressure and judged it more important to secure French
President Georges Pompidou’s consent to go ahead with enlargement.47 This
gentlemen’s agreement buried the Mansholt plan that represented everything unpop-
ular with European integration in Norway. But it also made the Six close ranks on
the existing CAP rules.48 Thus, when Norway presented its negotiation position to
the Community in June 1970, the Six stood more firmly than ever behind the CAP.
The defence of the acquis had now become a central part of the negotiation position.
Exceptions would be granted only for a transitional period which had to be the same
for every country and every sector. The unifying approach was reinforced by the
decision to let the Council and the Committee of Permanent Representatives
(Coreper) conduct the negotiations instead of letting every country negotiate on its
own behalf. The Commission was assigned the role of a mediator.49
There was some understanding among the Six about Norway’s main argument for
an exemption, i.e. the relatively insignificant size of its agriculture. At the same time
it was met with a powerful counter argument: the fear of setting a precedent. This
point concerned both the existing Community and the potential new members. To
accord one country permanent exemptions would not only undermine the basic prin-
ciples of solidarity, but such a step, it was argued, would also encourage both current
member states and applicants to ask for similar derivations thus undermining the CAP
and further complicating the enlargement process. Norway’s other argument, em-
phasising that special conditions asked for special rules, was rebutted as well. EC
representatives instead pointed to the possibility of granting special conditions for
certain regions, e.g. Northern Norway under the rules of regional policy. The moun-
46. See N.P. LUDLOW, Negotiationg the Gaullist challenge …, op.cit., p.191; H. TÜRK, Europapolitik
der Grossen Koalition, Oldenbourg, München, 2006, p.222; R.M. ALLERS, Alternatives to Mem-
bershipor temporary solutions? The German proposal for a commercial arrangement and the EEC’s
attitude towards NORDEK (1967-1970), in: J. HECKER-STAMPEHL (ed.), Nordic Ideology, pp.
167-187, here p.171.
47. See Carine Germond’s contribution to this special issue. See also G. THIEMEYER, The Mansholt
Plan, the definite financing of the Common Agricultural Policy and the enlargement of the Com-
munity, 1969-1973, in: J. VAN DER HARST (ed.), Beyond the Customs Union …, op.cit., pp.
197-222, here pp.217 f.
48. On the Mansholt plan see Katja Seidel’s contribution to this special issue.
49. N.P. LUDLOW, An Opportunity or a Threat. The European Commission and the Hague Council
of December 1969, in: Journal of European Integration History, 2(2003), pp.11–25. See also PA
AA, B 20, Bd.1901, Brussels to AA, 01.03.1972, Betr. Abschlußbericht über die Beitrittsverhand-
lungen.
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tainous regions of France and Germany and Southern Italy were mentioned as ex-
amples for regions receiving special support.50
Against this background, unlucky as it was, the timing of the CFP-initiative was
far from being unintended. As enlargement Commissioner Jean-Francois Deniau ex-
plained to Norwegian diplomats, the CFP was the final piece in the construction that
was the CAP.51 From the logic underpinning its French inspired strategy, the Com-
munity had to face the applicants with an established policy also in this sector. In fact,
given the applicants’ strength in the domain of fisheries, the Community seemed to
gain a considerable advantage from a common approach. Furthermore, national in-
terests of certain Community members also had an impact. According to the report
by British chief negotiator Sir Con O’Neill, the decision to agree on a directive es-
tablishing a CFP at the 30 June session resulted from internal pressure on the French
Minister who teamed up with his Dutch colleague Pierre Lardinois and was supported
by the Commission.52 As mentioned above, Norwegian politicians and diplomats,
together with their even more active Danish and British colleagues, had tried to in-
fluence the making of the CFP. Visiting Norway at the end of May, German Minister
of Economic Affairs Karl Schiller had been asked by government representatives to
intervene in Norway’s favour. Schiller indeed called his colleague, Minister of Agri-
culture Josef Ertl who represented Germany at the Council meeting on 30 June.53 Yet,
Ertl’s remark that Norway’s interests as a fishing nation should be taken into con-
sideration was met with opposition from a number of countries that had an interest
in strengthening the Community position on agriculture and fisheries as well as from
the Commission. The Dutch delegation feared
„bei allem Verständnis für die deutsche Haltung große Schwierigkeiten, wenn man die
Wünsche der Beitrittskandidaten schon jetzt berücksichtige. Die Gemeinschaft könne jetzt
keinen ‚standstill’ anwenden, sondern müsse ihre Vorstellungen präzisieren. Das schließe
nicht aus, daß später mit den Beitrittskandidaten hierüber gesprochen werde“.54
The episode is a good example of the Community method at work. It also shows that
German support for the applicants had a tendency to vanish once the unity among the
Six and friendship with France in particular was in danger. As Guido Thiemeyer has
pointed out, “Germany had to accept the French position as a precondition for en-
largement and deepening the Community”.55
50. 44.36/6.84-29, Referat, 1. Handelspol. kontor, 19.10.1967, Drøftingene med Mansholt; UD
44.36/6.84-25, Brussels to UD, 17.10.1966, Willochs samtale med Robert Marjolin; UD
44.36/6.84-25, Brussels to UD, 18.10.66, Willoch’s besøk i Brussel.
51. UD 44.36/6.84-36, Bonn to UD, 27.10.70, EEC-utvidelsesforhandlingene.
52. C. O’NEILL, Britain’s Entry into the European Community, David Hannay, London 2000, pp.251
and 253; PA AA, B 20, Bd.1833, Brussels to AA, 02.07.1970, 119. Tagung des Rates (Landwirt-
schaft) am 29. und 30. Juni in Luxemburg, hier: TO-Punkt 7: Gemeinsame Fischereipolitik.
53. PA AA, B 60, Bd.774, Oslo to AA, 30.06.1970, Besuch Schillers in Oslo; PA AA, B1, Bd.342,
Schiller an Brandt, 11.07.1970.
54. PA AA, B 20, Bd.1833, Brussels to AA, 02.07.1970, Betr.: 119. Tagung des Rates (Landwirtschaft)
29./30.6 in Luxemburg, hier: TO-Punkt 7: Gemeinsame Fischereipolitik; cf. C. O’NEILL, op.cit.,
pp.254-256.
55. G. THIEMEYER, op.cit. p.219.
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When the Norwegian demands were negotiated for the first time on 22 September,
the French Foreign Minister refused an initiative by the German presidency (sup-
ported by Dutch State Secretary Henri Johan de Koster), to consider the applicant’s
right to participate in shaping the CFP. According to Ambassador Jean-Marc
Boegner,
“M. Schumann a fait valoir qu’il convenait d’écarter toute formule susceptible d’entrainer,
sous une forme ou sous une autre, la participation des États candidats aux délibérations de
la Communauté”.56
The other members finally agreed on this position. In return Schumann proposed that
the Community could acknowledge Norway’s special problems in the fisheries sector,
particularly with regard to the maintenance of population in certain areas. While this
agreement of 22 September did not give Norway the assurance for the special treat-
ment it had asked for, it was later referred to when a special protocol was proposed
as the final compromise. The Community had thereby accepted Norway as a special
case. The tactical concept agreed upon at the first bilateral meeting in September 1970
was to recognise Norway’s special concerns and to postpone a solution until after the
British case had been solved.
Both parties were from the outset principled in their positions but willing to find
a compromise. For different reasons both inside the Norwegian government and
among the Six proponents for a principled stance were challenged by others who
opted for a more conciliatory line, open for compromise. In fact, as Aril Underdal
has pointed out, the negotiations were primarily integrative in character, with both
sides aiming for a successful conclusion.57
2. The negotiations
When negotiations moved beyond the fact finding phase in summer 1971, the two
positions were still quite far from each other. Due to internal pressure the Norwegian
government’s negotiating ability was extremely limited. The centre-right government
that had submitted the application had to resign in early 1971 over a disagreement on
the negotiation strategy. The labour government that succeeded it was unified in its
determination to continue negotiations and to meet the Community with a more pos-
itive attitude; yet it had to take the primary sector’s concerns into account as well.
A broad Anti-EEC coalition ranging from conservative agricultural interest
groups to the radical left had extended its campaign against entry. Following its forced
resignation from government in March 1971, the Centre Party abandoned its tactical
ambivalence and positioned itself unambiguously on the “No” side. This brought the
56. HAEU, SGCICEE, 12110, MAE, Boegner à Paris, 24.09.1970.
57. A. UNDERDAL, Forhandlingene om Norsk medlemskap i EF – En studie av rammebetingelser,
Master thesis, University of Oslo, 1972, p.68.
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number of votes necessary to reject the accession treaty in parliament short of two.
The fight about the votes in a consultative referendum therefore became even more
important. The Labour government, however, though in favour of membership, hes-
itated to campaign actively for entry. Instead, the party leadership proposed to wait
until after the terms of entry would be known, i.e. until after the end of negotiations,
before they would recommend membership. This can be seen either as an honourable
move of fairness or as a lack of leadership. The party elite, led by Prime Minister
Trygve Bratteli who did not hide his personal preference for membership out of po-
litical reasons, decided to show consideration for his voters at the periphery and for
the large group of euro-sceptics inside its ranks, particularly at the left wing and in
the party’s youth organisation, Arbeidernes Ungdoms Fylke (AUF). The result of this
strategy was twofold: it gave the no-side a huge head start and it increased the pressure
on the government to obtain a negotiation result in line with public expectations.58
In the meantime, the Heath-Pompidou summit of May 1971 had led to a break-
through in the British negotiations. This enabled the Six to concentrate on the other
candidates’ demands and to consider far reaching compromises without having to
fear British counter moves of a dimension that would exacerbate the entire process.
On the other hand, having concluded a deal with Britain, the Six had found acceptance
for their position in principle and were even less willing to compromise. Moreover,
the British deal still needed to be ratified and as the Financial Times remarked “there
would be an outcry from Britain fishermen if the Norwegians were to be given pref-
erential treatment”.59
A significant turn in the Community’s attitude occurred in summer 1971. Com-
munity negotiators at this point realised that Norwegian fears of not being able to
ratify an agreement unanimously rejected by the interest groups were real. As in-
tended by Norwegian negotiators the question now turned political. Following the
change of presidency in the EC, the Foreign Ministers of France and Italy, a number
of Ministers of Agriculture, and finally Commissioner Deniau visited Norway. The
Norwegians took them to the Northern coast and flew them in small planes over the
mountainous landscape in order to illustrate the conditions under which farmers had
to work.60 This strategy certainly had an effect on German representatives. Following
the visit of Ertl in July 1971, the German Ambassador to Norway saw it as a necessity
that the Federal government started to work for a political solution that would meet
Norway’s special demands in the agricultural sector as far as possible.61 Even before
the visit, the Auswärtiges Amt had argued that although Oslo’s demands still were at
odds with some Community principles, the size of Norwegian agriculture was so
marginal and the political reasons for an accession so important that more flexibility
58. For a critical assessment by a researcher close to the party establishment, N. ØRVIK, The Norwegian
Labor Party (NLP) and the 1972 Referendum, in: Idem. (ed.), Norway’s No to Europe, International
Studies: Occasional Papers, Pittsburgh, 1975, pp.19–41.
59. Six hear Oslo's demands for fishing, agriculture, in: Financial Times, 22.06.1971.
60. T. FRØYSNES, De norske jordbruksforhandlinger med EF. En forhandlingsteoretisk analyse,
Master thesis, University of Oslo, 1973, pp.131–138; cf. H. ALLEN, op.cit., p.116.
61. PA AA, B 60, Bd.774, Oslo to AA, 16.7.71, Besuch BM Ertls, 05–07.07.1971.
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was necessary.62 The Norwegian maximum demands, however, still seemed difficult
to achieve because Germany’s partners took a much more principled stand. According
to a key-official from the French Ministry of Commerce, the maintenance of defi-
ciency payments was regarded as particularly problematic. Referring to the danger
of setting precedence he said that France was “very much afraid of any kind of special
solution” and therefore regarded the Norwegian claims as problematic.63 Foreign
Minister Schumann recognized the special status of Norway’s agriculture, but re-
jected the claim for permanent exceptions. In the end, he stated on a visit to Oslo,
every country had to join the CAP. According to him, France had no particular interest
in Norwegian agriculture or fisheries. The whole question was „purely a matter of
principle“.64 Of, course, France did have quite interest in the fisheries sector and tried
to take care of them on the sidelines. However, French main interests were indeed a
matter of principle, based on the maintenance of the existing CAP rules. Any prece-
dence that would have given Britain or existing member states the possibility of
opening this chapter in the near or distant future was of potential danger to Paris.
One of the most outspoken critics of the Norwegian negotiation strategy, however,
was the Dutch Minister of Agriculture Pierre Lardinois. One had to bear in mind, he
told Oslo’s Ambassador, that sooner or later the Community would face lobbyists
seeking to exploit the precedence established by the Norwegian deal. The worst thing
that could happen would be a regionalisation of the CAP.65 Discussing the matter
with German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel in October 1971, Lardinois stated that
from a Dutch point of view, neither the fishery sector nor the agricultural sector should
obtain unlimited derogations, at least not formally. In the Council the Dutch delega-
tion boycotted an agreement on a compromise forwarded by the Commission that
would have recognised Norway as a special case and included prolonged transition
periods as well as financial support through Community funds. Two months later,
when Lardinois paid Norway a visit, he remained unimpressed by the mountainous
landscape that was meant to change his view on Norwegian special rights. Presumably
the weather was too good and the scenery too idyllic to drive home the argument, as
Norwegian Ambassador Søren Sommerfelt bitterly recalled.66 Desperate, Oslo even
felt the need to send State Secretary Thorvald Stoltenberg to The Hague in order to
remind the Dutch of their traditional support for enlargement.67 In the expert talks
that started at the same time, the tone reportedly was pragmatic and solution oriented;
62. PA AA, B 60, Bd.774, Aufzeichnung IIIA5, Unterlagen für BM Ertl zum Norwegen Besuch.
63. UD 44.36/6.84-40, Paris to UD, 14.07.1971, EF. Samtale med Brunet.
64. UD 44.36/6.84–41, Notat, 1. H.pol.ktr., 29.07.1971, Samtaler med utenriksminister Schumann,
23.07.1971. Emphasis in original text.
65. UD 44.36/8-8, Haag to UD, 29.07.1971, EF-Norge. Fiske/Landbruk.
66. S.C. SOMMERFELT, Sendemann, Schibsted, Oslo, 1997, p.151; cf. UD 44.36/8-8, 1. Handelspol.
kontor, 06.10.1971, Lardinois besøk i Norge, 16–19.09.1971.
67. UD 44.36/8-8, Den Haag to UD, 08.10.1971.
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at least concerning agriculture.68 A German diplomat attending a bilateral meeting
with Norwegian officials reported that representatives of the ministries for Agricul-
ture and Foreign Affairs now had been much more conciliatory than earlier, while
attitudes in the ministry of Fisheries remained unchanged.69
With both sides displaying a certain political willingness to reach an agreement,
negotiations went into their final phase after the summer break. In the agricultural
sector, the new government had abandoned rather quickly the maximum position of
the so-called “screening line” working for a permanent exemption from the CAP.
Instead it had pursued what was known as the “compensation line”, arguing that the
difference between the Norwegian price level and the Community level had to be
compensated for by the authorities. Similar to the position of the centre-right coalition
the Labour government insisted on the maintenance of deficiency payments and direct
subsidies as measure to compensate for the expected losses of farm incomes caused
by the adjustment to Community price levels. In addition, Norway wanted to keep
decision authority on the necessary adjustments under national control but to let the
Community pay for the compensations through its European Agricultural Guarantee
and Guidance Fund (EAGGF). These claims were not accepted entirely. But in early
November, the Community finally presented its proposal for a compromise that some
observers regarded as a fair deal. Under the condition that Norway would become
part of the Community, the latter agreed to allow direct subsidies for certain products
such as milk under the label of transport costs in order to guarantee supply for the
entire country. The remaining negotiations concerned the length of the transition
period for different groups of products. Here Norway obtained longer transitions than
originally planned. Reactions in Norway varied from moderately positive to fiercely
negative. The matter clearly was subject to interpretation as Norwegian Minister of
Agriculture Thorstein Treholt exclaimed: “Call it what you want, I call it permanent
exemptions”.70
By December 1971 the parties were able to finalize the agreement. Following the
meeting the Norwegian delegation said it would accept the Community’s proposal
for a special protocol attached to the accession treaty. By then, Trade Minister Per
Kleppe judged the result as satisfactory, with the reservation that the result for the
fisheries sector was still missing.71
The fisheries question, by contrast, was far from being resolved. The Norwegian
government managed to reach a deal on the market organisation that met its demands.
68. T. FRØYSNES, op.cit. pp.117-121; The author is grateful to comments by Helmut von Verschuer,
member of the Commission task force on enlargement and responsible for agricultural negotiations
with Norway, who confirmed the pragmatic, collegial and friendly atmosphere among negotiators
at the technical level.
69. PA AA, B 20, Bd.1835, III E 2 an Staatssekretär, 10.09.1971, Betr.: Integrationspolitische Gespräche
mit norwegischen Regierungsvertretern.
70. Quoted in: T. KALDAHL, Jordbruksforhandlinger og landbrukspolitikk 1950-1980, Landbruks-
forlaget, Oslo, 1994, pp.337 f.
71. Arbeiderbevegelsens arkiv og bibliotek (AAB), DNA, Da, 489, Per Kleppe: Markedssaken,
30.12.1971.
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The difficult question was the coastal regime, where Norway insisted on the perma-
nent maintenance of an exclusive zone of 12 miles. In the end, the fisheries question
even had the potential to sabotage not only Norway’s agreement but also the agree-
ments reached with the other candidates. On 12 November, Britain, Ireland and Den-
mark had finally accepted a Community proposal that foresaw exclusive 12-mile
zones for certain coastal areas. The transitional period would last until 1982 when the
Community would have to revise the question again. Britain’s chief negotiator Lord
Geoffrey Rippon triumphantly called the deal a de facto permanent exemption and
observers agreed that this was the end of CFP as it had been conceived in June
1970.72 Still, the Community had an interest in maintaining the impression that the
acquis was left intact and Schumann in particular rejected the idea that permanent
exemptions had been granted.73 But everybody was aware of the fact that Norway
wanted to obtain more from the Community than the others had obtained. Despite
heavy pressure from the British, they refused to join the 12 November deal. Instead,
Norway was following the advice it had been given by Community representatives
at the margins of the opening session on 22 September 1970: to wait for the conclusion
of a special deal until the question of British membership was resolved.74 Norwegian
experts had concluded from this advice that no agreement could be reached before
the conclusion of the British negotiations and acted accordingly.75 Already in July
Oslo had rejected a proposal by its co-applicants to join a multilateral session on the
fisheries question. Britain had just reached a breakthrough in its negotiations follow-
ing the summit meeting in June and had a strong interest in closing the remaining
chapters as soon as possible. To Ireland and Denmark the fisheries question, although
important, did not have the same significance it had for Norway.76 As Norway’s
Ambassador to the EC reminded his British colleague Kenneth Christofas, however,
the Six had regarded his country as a special case since September 1970. Now Norway
felt it had gained further understanding for its special conditions whereas the other
applicants had not. Therefore, a coordinated approach was not in Norway’s inter-
est.77 Following the successful vote on the negotiation result in the House of Com-
mons on 13 July 1971, the question of British entry seemed to be settled and the way
for a special deal with Norway open. Indeed, the Community kept its word and judged
Norwegian fisheries interests to be in a category apart. This did not mean, however,
that the Six had given up their reluctance to grant permanent exclusive rights. On the
72. H. ALLEN, op.cit., p.122. Cf. M. RASMUSSEN, State power …, op.cit., p.370.
73. B. DYNNA, Fiskerisektoren i de norske utvidelsesforhandlingene med EF (1970-72), Master thesis,
University of Oslo, 1973, pp.167 f.
74. UD 44.36/6.84-35, Brussels to UD, 3.10.1971, Norge-CEE. Samtale med Boegner; UD
44.36/6.84-36, Bonn to UD, 20.10.1970, Utvidelsesforhandlingene. Sommerfelts besøk i Brüssel
16.10.1970; PA AA, B 20, Bd.1834, III E/IA2, 17.09.1970, Norwegen.
75. UD 44.36/6.84-35, Brussels to UD, 05.10.1970, Norge EEC.
76. M. RASMUSSEN, The Hesitant European – History of Denmark’s Accession to the European
Communities 1970-1973, in: Journal of European Integration History, 2(2005), pp.47-74; M.
FITZGERALD, Ireland’s relations with the EEC. From the treaties of Rome to Membership, in:
Journal of European Integration History, 1(2001), pp.11–24.
77. UD 44.36/6.84-40, Brussels to UD, 26.06.1971, Norge-Storbritannia/Fiskerigrensen. See also UD
44.36/6.84-40, London to UD, 01.07.1971.
76 Robin M. ALLERS
https://doi.org/10.5771/0947-9511-2010-2-59
Generiert durch IP '77.245.13.132', am 03.04.2019, 13:24:06.
Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.
one hand, the basic principles steering the Community attitude and the position of
France in particular remained unchanged. On the other hand, the negotiations with
the other applicants were not finally closed. Both British and Irish negotiators threat-
ened to reconsider their agreement should the Norwegian obtain an all too favourable
deal.78 Signals from Brussels suggested that the EC would go a long way in meeting
Norwegian concerns but would stop short of granting the permanent maintenance of
a 12-mile zone wanted by Oslo.
In an effort to act in accordance with Community principles without abandoning
the claim for a 12-mile exclusive zone, the new government had decided to throw all
its weight behind the so-called settlement solution. By asking foreign vessels to reg-
ister properly in Norway, the right to equal access was meant to be circumvented.
This attempt was outright rejected by the Community and in the end the government
had to give in and opt for the once rejected division of the coastline. Acknowledging
the heavy pressure on the Norwegian government by increasingly unhappy pressure
groups, however, it was agreed that the exclusive zone would de facto include almost
the entire coastline stretching from the Northern Cape to Egersund only a few miles
away from the Southern most point. Still the question of a transitional period versus
a permanent agreement had to be resolved.
The final weeks were marked by intensive negotiations accompanied by efforts
at bilateral diplomacy. The central challenge was to find solutions that that did not
break openly with the acquis and avoided to provoke a renegotiation of the deal
reached with the other applicants.
The compromises
The agreement in the agricultural sector has been regarded as a fair compromise with
give and take on both sides. The agreement mirrored the negotiations that had de-
veloped in a rather pragmatic way, with a good understanding among experts at the
technical level. Not surprisingly, the agreement did not fulfil the maximum demands
put forward by the interest organisations. These groups had not been entirely negative
to the idea of EC membership, but their demands had been too high from the start
and now they felt that the government had sacrificed their interests in order to secure
an acceptable deal for the fisheries sector. The fisheries sector could not be entirely
disappointed, given the concessions laid down in a special protocol. In fact, due to
combined pressure from all four applicants, fisheries were the only sector of the entire
enlargement negotiation where the Community had abandoned its negotiation pos-
78. PA AA, (B 20), Bd.1917, Aufzeichnung G1 III E, 13.01.1972, Fischereipolitik; hier: englische
Reaktion auf die Norwegen-Formel.
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ition.79 The EC had agreed on a ten year transitional period and it had not excluded
the possibility of revising the CFP after the end of the period. This makes the CFP a
good example of the possible impact of an alliance of states with strong and well
defined interests that mounts an “attack” on the acquis in an area where EC interests
are contradictory or less well defined.80 In addition to its co-applicants, Norway had
obtained a de facto exemption of its entire coastline.
Nevertheless, interest organisations were still not content. First of all the result
was difficult to explain to the fishermen and to their supporters in the general public.
The EC had not been able to issue a formal guarantee that would have assured Norway
would maintain control over its extended exclusive zone beyond 1982. Political
guarantees had been issued by some governments, assuring that the Community
would never break its promise. This was not enough for those who feared from the
outset that a small state like Norway would be run over by the big member states in
every question of importance. And with the 30 June decision fresh in mind the sceptics
had a powerful example to point to. The Minister for Fisheries, recruited from an
interest organisation in order to secure their support, justified his resignation two days
before the signature of the treaty exclusively with the lack of a legally binding guar-
antee.81 Norwegian diplomats regarded this move as a decisive blow to membership
ambitions as it emphasised an enormous mistrust towards the Community itself.82
Only a limited number of politicians and government officials were ready to accept
the Community method.
This method had been explained rather bluntly by Pompidou in a conversation
with Bratteli in early January 1972. Every member state, the French President lec-
tured, wanted to safeguard its national interests and to obtain special rights – also
France. But in a Community nothing was as important as the maintenance of princi-
ples. Depicting himself as an almost impartial observer, he said that in his view the
Community had gone very far into Norway’s direction whereas Norway had barely
moved. Now everybody had to sit down in a marathon meeting and at the end of the
night a compromise would emerge that everybody had to accept.83
This prediction proved to be true, at least to some extent. The written result of this
compromise, however, the treaty of accession, was packed in such complicated
phrases that it was impossible to explain its presumed advantages to a broader public.
Following the signature of the treaty on 22 January, the Neue Zürcher Zeitung viewed
the opposition to Norwegian membership as weakened.84 In fact, the contrary was
79. E. WELLENSTEIN, L’élargissement de la Communauté, vu de Bruxelles, in: ASSOCIATION
GEORGES POMPIDOU (ed.), Georges Pompidou et l’Europe, Ed. Complexe, Paris, 1995, pp.
235 f.; J.M. BOEGNER, Le Marché Commun de six à neuf, Armand Colin, Paris 19762., pp.188 f.
80. M. RASMUSSEN, State power …, op.cit., pp.374.
81. His letter is printed in J. NYHAMAR, Nye utfordringer. Arbeiderbevegelsens historie i Norge, vol.
6, 1965–1990, Tiden Norsk Forlag, Oslo 1990, p.162.
82. PA AA, B 20, Bd.1917, Staatssekretär von Braun an Herrn D III, 19.01.1972, EWG-Norwegen.
83. UD 44.36/6.84-45, Brussels to UD, 07.01.1972, Samtale med president Pompidou.
84. Norwegens Einigung mit dem Gemeinsamen Markt. Geschwächte Stellung der Beitrittsgegner, in:
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 19.01.1972.
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true. An unholy but forceful alliance of farmers, urban intellectuals, and Christian
fundamentalists joined in a people’s movement against membership that had broad
appeal in the population. Resistance was not limited to but absolutely strongest at the
periphery, in areas dependent on agriculture and fishery. Their powerful interest or-
ganisations had both financial clout and organisational mobilizing capacity. Their
resistance, partly based on fear of change, partly on utilitarian reasons, had a strong
influence on their members and a great appeal to the population in general. In a
population of four million almost everybody had relatives with connections to a rural
Community.85
Conclusion
This article has set out to revisit the question why Norway had engaged in membership
negotiations with the EC in 1970 despite its difficulties with the concept of integration
and why the Community had opened negotiations with a country that not only wanted
to be excluded from the CAP and the CFP but also had severe reservations against
the political goals inherent in the Rome Treaties. It was argued that an analysis of the
negotiations themselves was needed to judge whether positions on both sides were
too principled to leave room for an acceptable compromise.
It can be argued that the negotiations themselves ended successfully. Norway had
to be satisfied with its status as a special case and even though no permanent exemp-
tion was achieved, it had obtained far reaching derogations from the CAP and the
CFP. The Norwegian government was able to look back on difficult negotiations
where both the Six and the other candidates accepted a deal that to a large degree was
the result of Norwegian stubbornness. But also the EC was able to regard the agree-
ment as a success, because the CAP principles and thus the acquis were left more or
less intact. More importantly, enlargement that had been a cause for tension through-
out the 1960s was finally brought on its way and could be expected to infuse the
Community with new dynamism.
However, taking the rejection of the treaty of adhesion in the popular referendum
of 25 September 1972 into account, it can be equally argued that the negotiations
were unsuccessful, first of all from a Norwegian perspective, but also both from a
Community perspective. The referendum proved what had been suspected by many
already during the negotiation’s final days, namely that negotiations had led to a
compromise that was not acceptable to interest groups. But the Bratteli government
had negotiated for a successful accession and refused to accept a looser accession
agreement as a fall back position. It resigned immediately after the referendum, leav-
85. N.P. GLEDITSCH et al., The Common Market issue in Norway: Conflict between center and pe-
riphery, in: Journal of Peace Research, 12(1975), pp.37-53; C. SCHYMIK, Europäische Anti-
Föderalisten. Volksbewegungen gegen die Europäische Union in Skandinavien, EKF Wissenschaft,
Leipzig, 2006.
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ing it to the mainly eurosceptical parties to negotiate a free trade agreement with the
EC. Nor could the Six be entirely satisfied with the final outcome of the Norwegian
case. There were certainly those who were not too unhappy seeing a potentially dif-
ficult partner opting out.86 But the general reaction was one of annoyance, disap-
pointment and – to some degree – self-criticism. First of all there was annoyance over
the fact that the Six had to revise original CFP and that even this move had not helped
convince all applicants to join. Some conference diplomats even wondered whether
Britain, Denmark and Ireland would have obtained such far reaching concessions,
had it not been for Norway’s tough negotiating style.
More generally, the Norwegian non-ratification left a stain on the first round of
enlargement. This failure was even more deplorable as Community representatives
had to acknowledge that Norway’s “no” –domestic reasons apart – was also a criti-
cism of the Community method and reflected growing dissatisfaction with the inte-
gration process. Following the Norwegian rejection of the treaty, some Community
representatives expressed self-criticism, deploring the way in which the EC had be-
haved during the negotiations. Le Monde called the decision a “Warning to all Eu-
ropeans”.87 Like Sicco Mansholt, however, most of them pointed to the Community’s
image rather than to the details and the substance of the negotiation.88
While the “classical Community Method”, i.e. the insistence on the unconditional
acceptance of the acquis by new members, was regarded as complicated and some-
times ineffective, it was seen as the best way to defend both Communitarian and
member state interests.89 Nevertheless, the widespread impression of failure, both on
the Norwegian and on the Community side, leads to the question whether the outcome
was predetermined and if negotiations could have turned out differently. Uwe
Kitzinger who in 1973 provided one of the first detailed accounts of the first round
of enlargement negotiations, has analysed them as „a self-contained system and a
procedure for settling minor issues of a transitional character“. Citing conference
diplomats he maintains that most of the questions on the table were of “gigantic
irrelevance” and could have been agreed upon over a cup of tea and a brandy.90 As
Norway’s case has shown, this did not mean that negotiations had to lead to a suc-
cessful ratification. Indeed, as Norwegian historians have argued, in 1962, 1967 and
1970-72 it was hard to see how any agreement that complied with the acquis could
have satisfied Norwegian interests. There was, however, nothing predetermined in
the outcome of the negotiations. Both public and internal records show that the out-
86. For examples see: Norwegens Nein – von vielen Erwünscht, in: Der Spiegel, 02.10.1972.
87. Un avertissement, in: Le Monde, 27.09.1972. See also Warnung aus dem Norden, in: Frankfurter
Rundschau, 27.09.1972.
88. Le ‘non’ de la Norvège, in: RTL-interview with Sicco Mansholt and Jean. Monnet, http://
www.ena.lu/non_norvege_rtl_26_septembre_1972-2-9070 .
89. C. PRESTON, Obstacles to EU Enlargement: The Classical Community Method and the Prospects
for a Wider Europe, in: Journal of Common Market Studies, 3(September 1995), pp.451-463. See
also M. RASMUSSEN, State power …, op.cit., pp.361 f.
90. U. KITZINGER, Diplomacy and Persuasion. How Britain Joined the Common Market, Thames
and Hudson, London, 1973, pp.75 and 77.
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come of negotiations as well as the result of the referendum campaign was undeter-
mined until the end. Enlargement negotiations were already in the early 1970s a
complex multilevel game, where certain norms and rules were applied and followed,
but where a multitude of different factors and actors defined the outcome.91 Officially,
Norway and the Community met 27 times during the 19 month long negotiations, ten
times at ministerial level and 17 times on deputy level. In addition there were count-
less informal consultations and meetings among experts. Depending on the subject
and on the phase, the expert level was more important than the political level whereas
in other phases political initiatives were decisive and able to push the process towards
a compromise. Also, bilateral contacts between applicants and member states could
have a decisive impact upon the negotiations. Such contacts were allowed and even
encouraged as long as they did not thwart the EC’s common negotiating position.
Together, these contacts had the side-effect of making the negotiations more inte-
grative and contributed to further understanding among negotiators. This explains to
some degree why it was possible to find a compromise even to Norway’s intricate
problems in the primary sector.
However, although negotiators constantly took domestic factors into account and
even used domestic pressure as a negotiation tool, they apparently operated too re-
motely from the people and in the Norwegian case the electorate had the final word
on the result. Until the failure of the last marathon sessions in January 1972 and the
subsequent resignation of the Norwegian Minister of Fisheries, there was still some
optimism among negotiators that the government would be able to defend the result
at home. Against the advice of some of his closest advisers and despite growing
opposition, Bratteli signed the accession treaty and started the ratification process.
During the eight months of hard campaigning the Labour party mobilised its troops
and the Yes-campaign gained some ground that was lost earlier. At the same time,
several incidences in Norway and in the EC made things more difficult for the pro-
ponents of entry.
At this point a counterfactual question might be introduced:92 was it right of the
Community to stay firm on its principles? What would have been the consequences
of granting Norway the far reaching exemptions it had asked for? A number of factors
were responsible for the “no” but the negotiations’ result and the way it had been
achieved clearly were among them. Norwegians were deeply disappointed at not
being able to make their voices heard in a sector where their country had to be regarded
as a central player. Farmers, fishermen and all those sceptical of European integration
got their view confirmed that a small state like Norway would not be in a position to
defend even its most vital interests.
91. A. UNDERDAL, Multinational Negotiation Parties – The Case of the European Community, in:
Cooperation and Conflict, 8(1973), pp.173–182.
92. On the pros and cons of introducing counterfactual questions into a historical analysis, see M.
BUNZL, Counterfactual History: A User's Guide, in: The American Historical Review June 2004,
http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/ahr/109.3/bunzl.html (28 Aug. 2010).
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Could the Community have acted differently? Was not there some more room to
stretch the principles a bit further, allowing the Norwegian government to “sell” the
result as representing a guarantee for safeguarding national interests in the agrarian
sector? Could not and should not the Community have accepted from the start that a
CFP was impossible to conceive without the participation of future members whose
inclusion would radically change the size and character of the regime? Would a spe-
cial regime for Norway really have jeopardized the conclusion of the enlargement
process and undermined the CAP?
It is certainly stimulating to take counterfactual questions as a starting point for a
discussion on the adequacy of the now “classical Community method”, centred on
the unconditional acceptance of the acquis. In a historical analysis, however, the
wider political context in which the negotiations took place cannot be ignored. The
1970-72 process was marked, first of all, by the French fear of an all out attack on
the CAP and by its partner’s politically motivated consent not to provoke a crisis over
this question. In an atmosphere still under the impression of the crises of the sixties,
and influenced by Germany’s preoccupation with support for its Ostpolitik, it is hard
to imagine the Community embarking on a major reform project that most certainly
would have endangered its internal cohesion. The unity of the Common Market was
in everybody’s interest and the consent on the centrality of the acquis was the kit that
held the Community together. Instead of using the applicant’s challenge to CAP and
CFP as an incitement to reform an arguably ill-devised and increasingly unpopular
policy, the acceptance of the acquis became the key concept of EC enlargement. To
the present day, this principle has made every further enlargement a painfully long
and ever more complicated process. On the one hand it protects the European Com-
munity (and today the EU) against disintegrating influences from future partners that
are unable or unwilling to share the full obligations of full membership. At the same
time, however, the insistence on the acquis seems to reduce the EC/EU’s ability to
absorb initiatives for reform.
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Taking Farmers off Welfare.
The EEC Commission’s Memorandum “Agriculture 1980” of
1968
Katja SEIDEL
Agriculture is in crisis, again. During his visit to the Paris Salon de l’Agriculture on 6
March 2010 French President Nicolas Sarkozy acknowledged that the sector suffered
from a climate of crisis and fear and that young people in particular must seriously
doubt whether they had a future in farming. He condemned the path the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) has taken since the early 1990s, namely to “exchange
prices against subventions”. Farmers, according to him, were entrepreneurs who nee-
ded to gain their incomes from prices and not subventions. At the same time, he
announced that, should the agricultural budget of the European Union (EU) be slashed
further, France would insist on Community preference and price policy to compensate
for the cuts, otherwise “ce n’est plus l’Europe”.1
Nearly fifty years after setting up the CAP and eighteen years after the 1992
MacSharry reforms, agricultural policy and the economic and social situation of far-
mers still draw the political attention in Europe. The fact that in the year 2010 the
French President advocates a strengthening of Community preference and a return to
price policy that had caused the EU budget nearly to collapse in the 1980s, invites an
analysis of the first attempt of reforming the CAP in 1968. Here, too, the point of
departure was “a feeling of despair” that had “gripped many farmers, who see no
future in their work”.2 In the late 1960s, the flaws of the CAP, a “welfare policy” the
European Economic Community (EEC) had established to help the agricultural sector
survive the economic and social transitions post-war Europe was undergoing, were
blatant.3 The situation was characterised by increasing costs of market support and
price policy – the two pillars of the CAP – and the inability of many farmers in the
six member states to generate a sufficient income in spite of the costly support me-
chanisms. At the same time the high agricultural prices started to lead to costly struc-
tural surpluses for some commodities, in particular dairy products, wheat and sugar.
1. Information and quotations from http://www.france-info.com/france-politique-2010-03-06-sarkozy-
annonce-des-mesures-de-soutien-a-l-agriculture-413962-9-10.html, accessed 06.03.2010.
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2. §33 of the “Memorandum on the Reform of Agriculture in the European Economic Community and
Annexes”, COM(68)1000 final, Parts A and B, 18.12.1968; Bulletin of the European Communities,
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